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POETICS AND UNDERSTANDING SUGGESTION 
 
Vedika Mati Hurdoyal Chekhori 
 
Abstract: In the history of Indian literary criticism (alaṃkāraśāstra) two texts have 
made significant contributions to the Indian Aesthetics; Dhvanyāloka by 
Ānandavardhana and Locana, a commentary on the first text by Abhinavgupta. 
Both the texts have influenced all the Indian critics of Sanskrit directly or 
indirectly. One of the major contributions of Ānandavardhana is that he includes 
emotive and other associative meanings under linguistic meaning. (Kane, 2015: 
154-90) As a result the theories of primary and secondary meaning which were 
developed by Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas were further developed by the poetics. 
It is noteworthy that Ānandavardhana was influenced by Bhartṛhari, the 
promulgator of the sphoṭa theory, Ānandavardhana therefore emphasized the 
importance of taking the whole utterance as a significant unitary linguistic symbol. 
He had also shown that the meaning of an utterance depends on contextual factors, 
and that the logical interpretation of the sentence-meaning on the basis of the 
individual word-meanings is defective in many cases. He also advanced that at 
times the meaning of the whole utterance is different from what the individual 
words indicate. Influenced by Bhartṛhari, Ānandavardhana developed his theory of 
language, however, his attempt was limited to poetic meaning.  
 
I. Concept of Vyañjanā 
 
Ānandavardhana’s understanding is an attempt to specify the nature of language and 
the way it operates. His aim has been to enlighten the aesthetic sense in men, who are 
open and perceptive to the finer aspects of language. Ṛgveda (Ṛgveda, X.71.4) 
distinguishes between the man who understands only the literal meaning of a poem 
and the man who looks more into the deeper significance of the passage than to the 
meanings of words therein; the former “sees, but does not see;” he hears but does not 
hear; it is only to the latter that speech “reveals herself completely, like a loving wife 
to her husband.” (Raja, 1963: 278) Yet another example from Rgveda (Ṛgveda, 
X.71.2) states that great poets select their words, winnowing away the chaff from the 
grain’, and only men of equal scholarship and literary taste can fully appreciate their 
poems. (Gardiner, 1932: 6) Ānandavardhana accepts the standard division of speech 
utterances into sentences and words, into stems and suffixes, and the distinction 
between the primary and the transferred or metaphorical sense of words (abhidhā and 
lakṣaṇā). (Raja, 1963: 279) In addition to these, he postulates a third potency of 
language which he calls ‘the capacity to suggest a meaning other than its literal 
meaning. (Borough, 1953: 173) This suggestive power of language is called 
vyañjanā. His main contention is that utterances possess literal meaning, and can also 
convey a further meaning, the ‘socio-cultural meaning,’ which includes everything 
other than the literal meaning. And under the term ‘meaning’ is included not only the 
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information conveyed, but also the emotion induced; this naturally necessitates the 
assumption of suggestive power of language. For even the Naiyāyikas and the 
Mīmāṃsakas cannot argue that the emotions induced by language are brought about 
by the literal power of the words. Again, he does not confine himself to the words and 
sentences as indicators of meaning but includes all the contextual factors, the 
intonation, stress, gestures and even the pure sounds used in the utterance, as well as 
the literal sense, as indicators of the full meaning of an utterance. Not only the 
expressive symbols (vācakas), but the indicative signs (bodhakas) like gestures also 
form part of language. Ānandavardhana is concerned only with poetic language, and 
therefore, omits many of these elements of speech from his field of observation. His 
primary concern is with the suggestion of elements that are of aesthetic value. Though 
vyañjanā, in the broadest sense of the term, embraces all such elements, it is only in 
its restricted sense as applied to poetry that Ānandavardhana studies this problem. His 
aim is to establish the doctrine of dhvani, which means vyañjanā applied to poetry. 
 
II. Concept of Dhvani and Criticisms against the Dhvani Theory 
 
Referring to Bhartṛihari’s terminology, it can be said that it is not only the prākṛta 
dhvani or the normal sound patterns which reveal the linguistic sign (sphoṭa), but 
even the vaikṛta dhvani or the individual modifications of the sound may have an 
important role in speech activity. Thus, we have to include in language, ‘even the set 
of derivations from the norm of the sound segments that signal the meaning of the 
speaker is drunk, the whispering of an utterance which signals the meaning that the 
content of it is secret, and the unusual distribution that is the cue to a metaphor. 
(Fries, 1954:67) The voice of the speaker can indicate whether it is a man or a 
woman, a child or a grown up person and can give even the identity of the speaker to 
those who know the voice of the speaker. He is concerned only with the poetic 
language, and therefore, omits many of these elements of speech from his field of 
observation. He is concerned only with the suggestion of elements that are of 
aesthetic value. Though vyañjanā, in the broadest sense of the term, embraces all such 
elements, it is only in its restricted sense as applied to poetry that Ānandavardhana 
studies the problem. His aim is to establish the doctrine of dhvani, which is referred to 
as vyañjanā applied to poetry. He borrows this term from the grammarians; in the 
same way as the sounds of utterances (dhvani) reveal the integral linguistic sign 
(sphoṭa), so also a good poem with its sound, as well as the literal sense, reveals, over 
and above the literal sense, a charming sense which has immense aesthetic value. 
Based on this, the term dhvani is applied to suggestive poetry when the suggested 
sense predominates over the literal sense. The term is also used to denote the 
suggested sense or the function of suggestion. Ānandavardhana in his Dhvanyāloka, 
establishes his theory that suggestion is the soul of poetry.1 According to him, there 
are two kinds of aesthetic ideas in a poetry; (i) literal (vācya) (ii) Implied (pratīyama). 
In the example of a beautiful girl the implied meaning may refer to the charm in a girl 
which is distinct from the beauty of the various parts of the body; this implied sense is 
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something more than the literal meaning which depends on the whole poem, and not 
merely on its parts.2 The expressed sense is invariably an idea or a figure of speech; 
but the suggested sense may be of three kinds: an idea, a figure of speech, or an 
emotion. This suggested sense is not understood by those who merely know grammar 
and lexicon; it is understood only by men of taste who know the essence of poetry.3 
This particular suggested sense is the most important element in poetry; in fact it is 
the soul of poetry whereby, words and their literal meanings occupy a subordinate 
position and suggest some charming sense (an idea, a figure of speech or an emotion) 
and it is called dhvani, which is said to be the highest type of poetry. In fact the 
doctrine of dhvani is only an extension of the rasa theory propounded by the ancient 
sage Bharata, according to which the main object of the dramatic work is to rouse 
aesthetic emotion (rasa) (Kane, 2015: 350) in the audience. Unlike his predecessors, 
Ānandavardhana has systematically dealt with the rasa theory and also extended it to 
poetry. He justifies that there is no conflict at all between the theory of dhvani and the 
theory of rasa; the former stresses the method of treatment, whereas the latter deals 
with the ultimate effect. Hence, suggestion by itself is not enough in drama or poetry; 
what is suggested must be charming, and this charm can come only through rasa or 
emotion. The emotion is not something which can be expressed directly by the words, 
it can only be suggested. A study of the rasa theory will be conducive to a better 
understanding of poetic language cognition. Basically, the theory of rasa emanates 
from the Nātyaśāstra. Rasa as an aesthetic experience is said to emanate from the 
combination of permanent and dominant emotional mood (sthāyibhāva), with the 
objects of emotion such as the hero and the heroine, causes such as flowers, 
moonlight and alike (vibhāvas), external manifestations of emotion such as the 
movement of the eyebrows, glances, smile (anubhāvas) and accessory moods 
(vyabhicāribhāva). In the same vein, Bharata mentions eight dominant emotional 
moods which produce eight different rasa namely: 1. Love (rati) - śrṇgāra; 2. 
Laughter (hāsa) – hāsya; 3. Sorrow (śoka) - karuṇa; 4. Anger (krodha) – raudra; 5. 
Energy (utsāha) – vīra; 6. Fear (bhaya) – bhayānaka; 7. Repugnance (jugupsā) –
bībhatsa, 8. Wonder (vismaya) – adbhuta, Later the ninth rasa was added called śanta 
derived from detachment (nirveda). 
Interestingly, Bharata’s process of rasa realization is differently interpreted by 
different scholars. Naiyāyikas consider rasa to be a matter of inference. However, 
Bhaṭṭanāyaka’s theory of the enjoyment of rasa lays stress on the subjective aspect of 
rasa as the aesthetic experience of the spectator. He distinguishes poetic language 
from ordinary language and postulates for the former two functions (1) bhāvakatva 
and (2) bhojakatva, in addition to the primary function abhidhā (which includes 
lakṣaṇā also).While bhāvakatva is the power of universalization, bhojakatva is the 
power by which the sthāyibhāva reaches its climax and is enjoyed by the spectators. 
Abhinavgupta, following Ānandavardhana, maintains that rasa is realized through 
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suggestion. He contends that sthāyibhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas are dormant in the 
minds of the spectators and are roused by the stimulus of vibhāvas and finally reach 
the state of rasa.4 According to him rasa is the suggested power of vyañjanā and that 
rasa realization is not indescribable. He lies akin with Bhaṭṭnāyaka for whom 
bhojakatva is nothing but suggestion. 5  More so, he delineates three different 
psychological stages in the realization of rasa. Firstly, it involves the cognition of the 
formal or intellectual elements of the poem which serves as a means to the second. 
Secondly, it consists of the idealization of things in poetry or drama by the power of 
imagination in the reader or spectator. Thirdly, the climax of the inexpressible 
affective condition of the reader or spectator. The theory of dhvani was vehemently 
criticized by Ālaṃkārikas. The Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas categorically denied the 
suggestive powers by words. However, later grammarians accepted it as necessary 
from the perspective of grammar.6 The following is an attempt to bring forth the main 
criticisms raised against the dhvani theory in Jayaratha’s commentary of 
Alaṃkārasarvasva. (Raja, 1963: 289) 
 
III. Dhvani, Anumāna and Arthāpatti 
 
In their search for accuracy and precision, Naiyāyikas reject vyañjanā śakti. 
Mahimabhaṭṭa in his Vyaktiviveka highlighted that dhvani comes under inference 
(anumāna).7 He contends that the implied sense in literature is always conveyed by 
the expressed sense through the process of inference itself and that there is no 
necessity to accept a new potency for words. Anticipating such an objection, 
Ānandavardhana in the third chapter of Dhvanyāloka, 8  refuted this argument by 
stating that inference depends on vyāpti, however, in literature there is no relation 
between the primary sense and the suggested sense, and therefore the latter cannot be 
inferred from the former. The view that dhvani is to be included in postulation 
(arthāpatti) is similar to the previous one; for arthāpatti is a kind of immediate 
inference based on the universal relation between the absence of the major and the 
absence of the middle terms. This is an attempt to define suggestion as impression 
through suppression. In every speech activity there are three things to be 
distinguished: expression, suppression and impression. Expression is what the speaker 
conveys, suppression is what he does not convey, though he might have given it, and 
impression is what the hearer receives. It is important to notice that an impression is 
often produced not only by what is said expressly, but also by what is suppressed. 
Professor Kuppuswmi Shastri recommends that this type of suggestion is to be 
accepted by all schools and that in the case of ordinary sentences, the individual 
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words give their isolated meanings, leaving the saṁsarga or the mutual relation of 
words to be conveyed by suppression or suggestion. The Naiyāyikas call this 
saṁsargamaryādā, while the Bhaṭṭa Mῑmāṃsakas consider it as based on lakṣanā. 
 
IV. Dhvani, Lakṣanā and Abhidhā 
 
Certain Ālamkārikas like Mukulabhaṭṭa opined that vyañjanā could be included under 
lakṣanā itself. He contends that lakṣanā refers to all instances where the expressed 
sense indicates other ideas are included in it, and he says that dhvani, propounded as a 
new doctrine by some literary critics, actually falls within the sphere of lakṣanā 
itself.9 However, Ānandavardhana regards this argument as an anti - dhvani theory by 
stressing that lakśaṇā and dhvani differ from each other with regard to their nature 
and subject matter. Lakṣaṇā operates when there is some kind of inconsistency in the 
primary sense; it indicates the secondary metaphorical sense after cancelling its 
primary sense, but in suggestion the primary sense need not be discarded.
10
 The 
Mῑmāṃsakas of the Prābhākara School who follow the anvitābhidhāna theory of 
verbal comprehension consider dhvani to be included in the primary function abhidhā 
itself; for according to them the meaning of a word is what is conveyed by it. There is 
no restriction to the scope of the significative force of a word. In a sentence, a word 
conveys not only its individual meaning, but also its relation to the other words in the 
sentence. The saṁsarga or the mutual relation of the word-meanings suggested by 
their juxtaposition in a sentence is also included in the primary meaning itself. In 
certain contexts, a word may suggest new ideas beyond its normal sense, but all those 
come under abhidhā itself. Just as the range of an arrow can be extended depending 
on the force with which it is discharged, the meaning of a word can be extended to 
any length. However, Ānandavardhana refutes this theory from the standpoint of the 
abhihitānvaya theory. The suggested sense cannot be conveyed by the power of 
abhidhā, for it is only the definite conventional sense, which is directly related to 
word, that is conveyed by abhidhā. The power of the primary function of the word is 
exhausted when this task is performed. (Śabara- sūtra, I.I.25) Another function has to 
be accepted to explain suggested meanings. The primary sense is directly related to 
the word, but the suggested sense is, at times, known only indirectly through the 
expressed sense. Moreover, suggestion need not always depend on words; the melody 
of music, gestures, etc. is suggestive of sense. (Dhvaṇyāloka, 188) .Primary sense of a 
word can be objectively learned by any one from the lexicon; but the suggested sense 
in poetry can be fully appreciated only by men of taste. (Ibid.29) 
 
V. Dhvani, Tātparyavṛṭṭi and Vakrokti 
 
Yet another issue about certain alamkārikas like Dhanika and Dhanamjaya include 
dhvani under tātparyavṛṭṭi, a function of the sentence postulated to explain the verbal 
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comprehension arising from a sentence. The direct relation of the word is to its 
isolated meaning; in a sentence the primary function of the words is exhausted, when 
the isolated meanings of the individual words are presented. The mutual relation of 
the isolated word-meanings or saṃsarga as it is called, is not conveyed by the words 
directly. It is not expressed, it is only suggested. This is done according to them by 
the tātparyavṛṭṭi. The issue is as to whether poetic suggestion can also be included 
here. It is postulated that tātparyavṛṭṭi is used to explain the literal meaning of a 
sentence, whereas, vyañjanā comes at the next stage. The power of the former is 
exhausted by establishing the logical connection of the word-meanings, and cannot 
give further suggestions. Abhinavgupta says that when an expression gives its own 
literal meaning, and in addition suggests some other sense, we cannot regard both 
these distinct senses as conveyed by the same power. The former proceeds directly 
from the words while the latter comes from the literal sense. Tātparya pertains to the 
expressed sense, whereas dhvani pertains to non-expressive factors also such as 
music, gesture, etc. Hence, Dhanamjaya and Dhanika oppose the dhvani theory and 
include it under tātparya, as per them the power of tātparya is not exhausted in giving 
the logical connection of the word-meanings, but can extend to any length. However, 
some of the Alaṁkārikas have accepted tātparya almost as synonymous with 
suggestion. Kuntaka in Vakroktijῑvita, denied the independent existence of dhvani and 
included it under vakrokti or ‘a striking mode of speech’. His vakrokti is all pervading 
and is almost analogous to dhvani itself. Rhetoricians accept three-fold potency in the 
words: primary (abhidhā), secondary (lakṣaṇā) and tertiary (vyañjanā) and 
accordingly they interpret three kinds of meanings literal, figurative and implied. 
Thus, above are the main arguments advanced against the dhvani theory. The Nyāya 
and the Mīmāṃsā, do not recognize the suggestive power of words at all. Later, 
grammarians, however, accept it as necessary from the standpoint of grammar. 
 
VI. Vyañjanā: An Analysis 
 
It is the meaning that comes out when the third force acts on for it and the literal and 
figurative meaning are not conducive. It is the capacity of suggestiveness of 
implication which differs from abhidhā and vyañjaṇā. 11 Let us interpret the example 
which is analyzed by poetics, an account of which may be given as follows: 
Gangāyām Ghośaḥ: Hamlet in the current of water: This is the literal meaning. This 
literal meaning is not conducive and then the second power lakṣaṇā comes forward to 
operate for the lakṣaṇārtha (suggestive meaning) through which we know the 
‘Hamlet on the bank of the river’. If this meaning is also not conducive to a context, 
other tertiary force comes into action. For example: If someone expresses the 
statement Gangāyām Ghośaḥ in Mauritius, it means neither the literal nor the 
suggestive. It refers to the implied meaning. This implication is made on the basis of 
qualities (some or the other) for which the word is literally used, that is, it means that 
my house is cool and sacred (sitatva and pāvanatva). Another instance is given by 
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scholars to understand vyañjaṇā, Aṣtā Calam Gatau Surya: The Sun has set. The 
literal meaning of the above is very much clear to all with little variations but the 
figurative meanings, may mean a glorious man has departed; this is by the secondary 
force lakṣyārtha śakti. But when it is taken to mean, it is the proper time to perform. 
Here in the case of implied meaning, the meaning abandons the expression. Vyañjaṇā 
acts on when lakṣaṇā and abhidhā are not abhidhārtha and lakṣaṇārtha as conducive. 
It arises from the implication from the primary meaning of the language. According to 
poetics, there is an order which means that they firstly accept the literal, suggestive 
and implied. But the question is: is this order necessary for knowing verbal cognition? 
As per scholars like D.N Tiwari, there are many examples that shed light that 
vyañjanārtha in some cases functions independently without a consideration of 
abhidhā and lakṣaṇā. An example given by him has been explained. (Tiwari, 2014: 
218) “A lover is sitting with his beloved on the bank of a river. On seeing a crane, the 
beloved point out to it and utters: ‘See, the crane is enjoying tranquility.” Here, the 
primary and secondary signification of the sentence is not intended in use. However, a 
different meaning that is a motivation and stimulation to the lover for ‘embracing her 
without any fear from disturbing elements or ‘time’ or an occasion fit for embracing 
her’ are directly suggested by it. The example is sufficient to tell that these powers do 
not act in an order and that more than one tertiary meaning of the sentence is possible 
because of which arbitrariness in the determination of meaning cannot be over-
looked. Unlike, the Vedāntins and Mīmāṃsakas who accept only two signifying 
powers; literal power (abhidhā śakti) and figurative power (lakṣaṇā śakti), Indian 
rhetoric Mammata and Vishwanātha assume a third one i.e., suggestive power 
(vyañjanāśakti). According to the advocates of vyañjanā theory, there are three 
powers in words because of which different kinds of meanings, namely literal, 
figurative and implied are known by the use of a word. These powers act on for their 
meanings in an order, For example, secondary power acts on for figurative where 
literal meaning is not operating to and the vyañjanāśakti acts on for implied meaning 
if earlier two powers are not conducive to the use. However, this is not fixed in an 
order. The rhetoricians accept two sorts of Vyañjanā: śābdi and ārthi. Śābdi 
vyañjanā, implicative meaning is taken out from some specific word śabda viśeṣa. In 
śābdi implication is caused by the specific word. In ārthi vyañjanā, implication arises 
from the meaning of the complete sentence, unlike, some words carry multiple 
meaning. It is ārthi if implication arises from the meaning of the complete sentence, 
unlike śābdi. It does not arise from specific word. For example, Kanaka means gold 
and dhaturā (poisonous apple) etc. Bhudhāraḥ means man and mountain. They carry 
double meaning: If the expression is Kanaka it means intoxication. Then the popular 
meaning is dhaturā (poisonous apple) is intoxicating. But the implicative meaning 
does not attach with desire for gold. This is possible only if the word ‘kanaka’ is 
substituted by and thus the meaning of the word “kanaka” being equivocal gives rise 
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VII. Śābdivyañjanā, Abhidhamūllā and Lakṣaṇāmūlā 
 
Śābdivyañjanā is of two types. (1) Abhidhāmūllā – that which depends on literal 
primary meaning, Bhudāra and hence Abhidhamūlā lakṣaṇā; (2) Lakṣaṇāmūlā - that 
which depends on secondary meaning. In the example, the hamlet in the current of 
water, suggestiveness comes from figurative meaning. 12 In case the literal meaning 
(abhidhā) serves as the basis of suggestive meaning, the lakṣaṇā is called 
abhidhāmūla. (Sahitya Darpaṇa 2/14) For example “Durataḥ Bhudhāraḥ Ramyā” 
which means to live at a respectable distance from the kings. In this example, 
suggestiveness depends on the literal meaning (vācyārtha) meaning of ‘bhudhārā’ 
and for this reason it is known as abhidhāmūlā. In case of lakṣṇāmūlā suggestiveness 
depends on secondary meaning (lakṣyārtha), then the vyañjaṇā: the house being cool 
and sacred13  as vyañgyārtha known as lakṣaṇāmūlā in which the literal meaning 
serves only as the base of suggestiveness and by that suggestiveness the vyañgyārtha 
comes forth.  
 
VIII. Ārthi Vyañjanā 
 
In case of ārthivyaṇjanā, the suggestive meaning does not depend on any particular 
word used for abhidhā or lakṣaṇā but on the complete sentence as a whole. In that 
case, the vyaṇjanā is called ārthi for example: The Sun has set. The literal meaning of 
the sentence is clear to all. This literal meaning serves as the cause of the rise of 
several suggestive meanings, for example: Night will fall. A cowherd may take it for 
the right time to herd the cows. A dancer may take it to mean the right time to prepare 
for the dance performance, while a  student may take it as the right time to pack up 
from school. The neighbor of the ailing great man may take it to mean that the latter 
has died and so on and so forth. Vyañjanā arises from the complete meaning of the 
sentence. Since its literal meaning is one (sun has set). It can suggest so many 
implicative meanings. Vishwanatha and Mammatta have mentioned conditions for 
determining the ārthivyañjanā. (Kavyaprakaśa 12/16) The implicative meaning of the 
sentence carried the meaning of sentence may have the condition of the nature of the 
speaker (vyakti vaiśiṣthya), nature of the hearer, bodhavaiśiṣthya, proximity of the 
sentence, anyavākya, sannidhi, space and time. These are the factors through which 
will emerge implicative meaning. They have included in the list the factors like kāku 
ceṣtā for the determination of ārthivyañjanā. In the sentence: the sun has set. If it is 
spoken by a Jaina sādhaka, it may mean I shall not eat now (after sunset). If it is 
uttered by a mother it means that she is fasting (ekādaśivrata). For the Muslims, it is 
the time to start eating if he is keeping roza. Place: Time to stop the journey to the 
nearby village and start cooking. It seems from the illustration that the condition in 
which the difference between vyañgyārtha are taken out of the suggestive meaning of 
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13 Gangāyām ghośaḥ saityapavanā’tvādi lakṣanāmūlā vyañjanā – Kavyaprakāśa. 
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the expression is not exclusive and exhaustive. This is only a helping guide to 
interpret the intended meaning in different situations. 
 
IX. The Primacy of Vyañjanā in Rhetorics Thought 
 
The question is often asked that vyaṇjaṇā is not inference but it can be reduced to 
inference and the possibility of reducing by Vyakiviveka of Mahima Bhaṭṭa. But 
Mammatta in Kāvya Prakāśa pleaded against this view because of the reason that 
hetu is necessary. Without hetu, inference is impossible. But that is not the case of 
vyañjanā (suggestive meaning). The point that needs to be clarified refers as to why 
vyañjanā has to be accepted at all. What are the differences among vyañjanā form 
lakṣaṇā and abhidhā? In response to this question, it can be clearly said that literal 
meaning is popular meaning (vācyārtha) and is for all without alteration. Lakśaṇārtha 
is known by the imposition of popular meaning on another meaning because of the 
intention of the speaker. But the vyañjanā differs according to the intention of the 
speakers, listeners and the context. For example: Gangāyām ghośaḥ. If the 
expression: ‘Gangāyām ghośaḥ’ is uttered to a hearer nearby the sea-shore, it may 
mean a house-boat or a huge fish. Similarly, the statement Saindhavam ānaya (Bring 
Saindhava), if it is expressed by one who has to march onto war, Saindhava would 
mean horse but if in the context of dinner, it would mean salt. Sometimes, 
vyañgyārtha is found to be as different from the literal meaning, that it becomes 
difficult to relate the two belonging the meaning of the same word. For example: A 
mother caring for her child forbids the latter to roam around the neighboring enemy’s 
house. However, the child does not pay heed to the mother and continues and 
adventuring. In anger, the mother utters: ‘Visha Khao’. The meaning is do not take 
food in others house. The literal meaning is take poison but the vyañgyārtha is an 
emphatic way by viṣam bhunkta is for ‘never take food in her house’. The rhetorics 
posit vyañjanā at the center of the verbal cognition and show as to how the literal and 
the suggestive meanings are limited in themselves in conveying the proper meaning 
which for them is vyañgyārtha.14 Here, an analogy can be given to shed clear light on 
their view of verbal cognition. The analogy is that of an arrow piercing a body. To 
reach the flesh the arrow has to firstly pierce the shirt, the skin and the flesh and then 
the heart. In the same way, when the literal meaning cannot convey the proper 
meaning, the next resort is to suggestive meaning and finally the meaning is 
apprehended through vyañjanā. 
 
X. Rhetoric View of Lakṣaṇā. 
 
To better comprehend the poetics’ understanding of vyañjanā, it is important to grasp 
their stand on lakṣaṇā as well. Lakṣaṇā is the secondary sense and is taken recourse to 
when the primary meaning is not conducive or is obstructed (bādhita), it then gives 
                                                             
14 The point is made after a discussion in person with Prof. D. N. Tiwari in the Spring 2015 
issue of the Journal of East-West Thought. 
64 VEDIKA MATI HURDOYAL CHEKHORI 
 
Journal of East-West Thought 
 
space for figurative meaning, for example the sentence: ‘Mauritius is a wonder.’ The 
secondary meaning of the word ‘Heaven’ does not fit in because Mauritius is a 
country having geography, landscape with trees, mountains, river and sea and not a 
trans-empirical entity like ‘heaven’. Hence, Mauritius cannot be taken literally but 
only figuratively as being a ‘wonder.’ Thus, we find that in the case of cognizing 
vācyārtha (literal meaning), there is some difficulty and therefore recourse is taken to 
lakṣaṇā. In other words, the question of lakṣaṇā arises only when the primary 
meaning is not construed or obstructed (mukhyārtha śabda). Now, if there is some 
incompatibility to know the literal meaning then in the sentence lakṣaṇā is taken 
recourse to by lakṣaṇā śakti. For example, the sentence: ‘The Man is a lion.’ Here the 
characteristic feature of a lion namely, braveness is taken to resemble in the man. 
Thus, figurative meaning bears relation with the primary meaning. Acārya Mammaṭṭa 
describes lakṣaṇā according to its three-fold characteristics. 15(i) Mukhyārtha bādha - 
obstruction of primary meaning. (ii) Mukhyārtha yuktaḥ - Substitution of another 
meaning associated with the primary. (iii) Ruḍhi and prayojaṇa - Some convention 
and purpose. Naiyāyika Varadarāja Acārya in his Tāṛkikarakṣà also gives a similar 
definition of lakṣanā.16 Meaning, thus, is that the primary meaning is abandoned and 
the secondary meaning in the usage is taken by ruḍhi (convention) and purpose 
(prayojana). This lakṣyārtha is known almost differently from the literal meaning. 
 
XI. Types of Lakṣaṇā, Ruḍha Lakṣaṇā & Prayojanāvati Lakṣaṇā 
 
Rhetoricians broadly classify lakṣaṇā into two: (i) conventional (Ruḍha) and (ii) 
Purposive (Prayojanavati lakṣaṇā).17 When the figurative meaning becomes popular 
in usage, it is called ruḍha. For example, the leg of the table, the eye of the needle etc. 
such usages of the leg and eye with table and needle have become so conventionally 
popular as if they are the literal meaning of the words but we know that it is only by 
the device of lakṣaṇā that the word leg, eyes are used with table and needle. In some 
cases, figurative meaning becomes as fixed as if it gets the force of literal meaning of 
the word taken purposively. For example, the Sanskrit word ‘padam’ means step but 
in usage it means word. Similarly, the word ‘kuśal’ means ‘sharp’, however, its 
figurative meaning is excellent, intelligent. Let us consider the sentence: Gangāyām 
Ghośaḥ: The literal meaning of the statement is ‘Hamlet in the current of water’ but 
its figurative (lakṣaṇārtha) is purposive ‘Hamlet on the bank of the river.’ It is this 
meaning for which the expression is popularly used that is it is as popular as if it is the 
literal power of the word. In precise, the purposive use for a particular purpose is used 
figuratively for some meaning and the meaning gets the popular force in usage 
                                                             
15  Mukhārtha Bāddhe Tadyogo Ruddhito’artha prayojanāta anyahorthaḥ lakṣyate yat sā 
lakṣanāropitākriyā. 
16  Mukhārtha Bāddhe Tadyogo Ruddhitoartha prayojanāta anyahorthaḥ lakṣyate yat sā 
lakṣanāropitākriyā. 
17 Niṛudhāḥ lakṣaṇāḥ kāścita sāmarthyādabhidhānavata- vṛṭṭi on Tarkasamgraha by Annam 
Bhaṭṭa. 
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(convention). In the sentence “Hamlet on the bank of river’-the purposive meaning of 
the sentence is known popularly by the sentence ‘Gangāyām Ghośaḥ.”18 
 
 
XII. Further Classification of Lakṣaṇā & Ajahat Lakṣaṇā 
 
Rhetoricians have further divided lakṣaṇā, an account of which follows: Jahad 
Lakṣaṇā. The statement: Mañcā Krośanti: The literal meaning of mañcā is stage but 
the figurative meaning is the man making noise from the mañcā the crop field 
protector of maize, millet makes loud noises, cries to scare away animals like jackals 
is the meaning of the expression because the mañcā is inanimate that cannot cry and 
therefore with the meaning of a certain person sitting on the mañcā is derived by 
jahat svārthā.19 In that type of figurative meaning, literal meaning is not abandoned, 
but the figurative meaning widens the literal as well. For example, the following 
sentence, ‘Protect the curd from the crows.’ The literal meaning is to protect the curd 
only against crows, however, a cat or other animals can also eat the curd, hence, the 
literal meaning is not conducive and figurative meaning of the sentence under 
analysis is to protect the curd from all its destroyers is conducive and that is intended 
meaning lakṣaṇā. Meaning thereby, that curd must be protected from all the 
destroyers (upaghātakas) like crow, cat etc, that may destroy the curd. 20Thus, the 
primary meaning is partly given up and partly retained .Vedāntins interpret the great 
sayings using this technique. 
 
XIII. Jahatajahat Lakṣaṇā, Suddhā & Gauṇi 
 
Soyam Devadatta: This is That Devadatta, figuratively by jahat ajahat lakṣaṇa. It is 
also called as bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇā. In the example So’yam Devdattaḥ’, the word 
Devadatta (who is here) is the same whom I saw in the past. The meaning of the 
sameness of Devadatta is known by retaining Devadatta of past memory and present 
experience and giving up the past and present differences of perceiving ‘Devadatta’ 
The expression partly retains and partly gives up to convey the meaning. Gauṇi 
Lakṣaṇā. Sādṛśyātt Tu Matā Gauṇi. 21  According to this definition of Sahitya 
Darpaṇa, lakṣaṇā based on similarity is called gauṇi. By some similarity the 
foolishness/ voraciousness/laziness or any of the qualities inhering in the meaning of 
the cow that is ‘cowness’ is imposed on the secondary meaning called gauṇi lakṣaṇā. 
For example, the literal meaning of the word ‘cow’ is ‘cowness’ but secondarily it 
means a lazy innocent boy, in the case of this statement. This man is (a) cow. That 
man is ox, in this sentence differences of forms etc. are ignored and point of similarity 
                                                             
18 Gangāpadsya tatva lakṣaṇyā tirasya bodhaḥ - Siddhānta Muktāvali, Viśvanātha Pañcānana. 
19 Mancāḥ kṛośanti iti atra vākyārthasya kṛośana kartṛtvānavyāsambhavāta mancha padam 
manchasthapuruṣa lākṣanokam: Siddhānta Muktāvali, Viśvanāthapañcānana. 
20 Atra dadhyupaghātakebhyaḥ dadhi rakṣeṇe tātparyaṃ: Nyāyabodhini Govardhanācārya 
21 sādṛṣyāt tu matā gauṇi- Sahitya Darpana, Viṣvanātha 2/10. 
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 The specific character of gauṇi lakṣaṇā lies in the upacāra (figuring of 
the literal meaning by some device like similarity, resemblance and opposition). The 
lakṣaṇā based on similarity is called gauṇi. In the literature, rupaka alamkāra is the 
best example of Gauṇi lakṣaṇā.‘Mukha Chandra’: ‘Your face is moon,’ this can be 
described as a suppressed simile.  
 
XIV. Suddha lakṣaṇā, Upādāṇa Lakṣaṇā, Lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā & Lakṣaṇa Lakṣanā 
 
This is based on some relation other than similarity, for example, ‘Virtue is 
Happiness.’ Happiness is not similar to virtue but since virtue causes happiness, the 
relation between the two is established.23 ‘This girl is fiery,’ a girl cannot be fire but it 
is by figuration of some qualities (aggressiveness etc) of girl identical to the nature of 
fire that the sentence intends to the meaning ‘keep away’ from the girl. Suddha 
lakṣaṇā can also be seen in the form of kārya kāraṇa saṁbandha for example: 
Ghṛtam āyuḥ: Ghee is life ‘ghee is glow, health and life giving, in other words ghee is 
identified with life because of its life-giving relation. Mammaṭṭa in Kavya Prakāśa 
defines uppādāna lakṣaṇā as an imposition of some other word for making its own 
meaning clear. For example,24 Kuntāḥ praviśyanti Bhale aa rahe hain (spears are 
entering) śveto dhāvataḥ (the white runs). Spears (kuntāḥ) being inert do not enter 
into palace themselves. The other word ‘spearmen’ is imposed to make the meaning 
of the other clear. In the example ‘śvetodhāvati’: The word ‘horse’ is imposed to 
make the meaning of the word ‘white’ sveta clear. In precise, the white (color) has no 
fitness to run, therefore to make the meaning of the expresser aśvodhāvati, the word 
horse by ākeṣpa or ādhyā (rope) is brought into and that is necessary for the rendering 
of the meaning of the expresser intelligible. 25  Sahitya Darpaṇa defines lakṣaṇa 
lakṣaṇā as that whose case, the original meaning of the expression is given up. The 
words give up their original sense of conveying intelligibility to another word26 for 
example: ‘Mauritius is alive’- the word ‘Mauritius’ gives up original meaning ‘island’ 
and assumes another meaning ‘alive, the quality of being animated’. This giving up of 
the meaning is necessary to make the meaning of the word ‘alive’ intelligible. 
(Sahitya Darpana 2/7) Mādhavācārya in Sarvadarśansamgraha 27  has made a 
distinction between upādāna and lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā with the reference of śvetodhyāvati. 
In which the word ‘white’ retains its original meaning and only its operation is made 
possible by bringing up the other word which makes this sentence meaningful. But in 
                                                             
22  Gaurvāhikaḥ atra gavā budhimāndyādau sādṛṣyātjada ityarthaḥ lakṣayate – Sahitya 
Darpaṇa. 
23 Sādṛśyetara sabandhaḥ suddhāstāḥ sakatā’pi, Ibid. 2/9. 
24 Atra Kūṇtāṇāṃ śaśtraviśeṣaṇāṃ acetanānām praveśaṇakṛiyā kartṛtvāsambhavāta – Kavya 
prakāśa, 2/10. 
25 Mukhyārthasye tarākṣepo vākyārthanvaya siddhaye syādātmāno’pyupādānāt eṣopādāṇat 
lakṣaṇā, Sāhitya – Darpaṇa, 2/10. 
26 Arpaṇam svasya vakyārtha parasyānavayāsiddhaye upalakṣaṇa hetutvāt eṣa lakṣaṇa. lakṣaṇā 
–Sahitya Darpaṇa 2/7. 
27  Svārthāparityāgenaiva parārthe gṛahaṇam upādādānam svārthāparityāgena parārtha 
gṛahaṇam lakṣanaṃ iti –Sarvadarshan samgraha. 
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case of lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā it takes that the literal meaning of the word is abandoned to 
make the meaning of the word “alive” that is “fall of liveliness” clear. The difference 
between the upādāṇa lakṣaṇā and lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā is that the former is a case of 
Ajahat svārtha lakṣaṇā while the latter is an instance of Jahat lakṣaṇā.  
 
XV. Saropā (By imposition), Sādhya Vasāna Lakṣaṇā & Sādhyavasanā 
 
Mammatta defines saropā lakṣaṇā in terms of the identity of the subject on which the 
āropa (imposition) is being made but is not swallowed up by that which is imposed.28 
For example: Annam Vai Brahman: Food is Brahman. The subject (food) on which 
the imposition of Brahman is made is not swallowed up by that Brahman which is 
imposed. The sādhyavasānā is defined by Mādhavācārya in Sarvadarśansamgraha as 
that in which the imposition is made completely swallowed up by that which is 
imposed on it. For example, ‘Destroy the thorns’ means destroy the enemies. The 
word enemy is the subject of imposition is not mentioned here. It is swallowed up by 
the viśaya (subject), thorn which is imposed on the enemy this is called sādhyavasanā 
lakṣaṇā.29 Vedantins do not accept vyañjanā but they give importance to lakṣaṇā as 
much as they interpret the meaning of the mahāvākya. But for that, they have to 




Ānandavardhana and his followers agreed with the grammarian’s view about the 
unity of the sentence-meaning. Most of the criticisms raised against the dhvani theory 
are mainly because poets and literary critics did not confine themselves to a relatively 
small portion of language behavior which is definite, but attempted to extend it to the 
totality of human experience, including the emotional. (Raja, 1963: 315) 
Abhinavgupta though agrees with many of the suggestions put forward by rasa theory 
also points at its various limitations. According to him art is not just about evoking 
certain feelings but a real work of art in addition to possessing emotive charge needs 
to have a strong sense of suggestion and capacity to produce various meanings. This 
is where he refers to Dhvanivāda. He states that for a work of art it is not enough to 
be having abhidhā and lakṣaṇā but it should also possess vyañjanā, which has 
absolutely nothing to do with the other two levels of meaning. Thus, an aesthetic 
experience cannot be experienced like any ordinary mundane experience. 
Abhinavgupta turned his attention away from the linguistic and related abstractions 
which had preoccupied even Ānandavardhana, focusing his attention instead on the 
human mind, specifically the mind of a reader or viewer of a literary work. 
 
 
                                                             
28Viṣayasyanigirṇasyānyatādātmya pratitikṛta sāropā syāt nigirṇasyamatā sādhyāvasānikā - 
Sarvadarshana samgraha. 
29Sāropāṇyā tu kvo viśayaḥ viṣayitathā viśayāntaḥ kṛte’nyasmina sa syāt sādhyāvasānikā – 
kavya prakasha 2/14. 
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